








Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a
sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where
bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining
session of Rubinstein (1982), two players negotiate to determine who leaves the bar-
gaining and with how much. A player may either make an o®er to his opponent who
would then leave the game or demand to leave the game himself. Players' ¯nal distri-
bution of the pie and a bargaining protocol constitute an equilibrium outcome. When
discounting is not too high, we ¯nd multiple subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes,
including ine±cient ones. As the number of players increases, both the set of discount
factors that support multiple equilibrium outcomes and the set of the ¯rst proposing
player's equilibrium shares are enlarged. The ine±ciency in equilibrium remains even
as the discount factor goes to one.
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Bargaining problems deal with situations where a number of players negotiate how to share
their gains obtained through trade. In a seminal paper, Rubinstein (1982) studied a highly
stylized non-cooperative bilateral bargaining model with discounting, and showed that the
subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and its outcome is e±cient. Multilateral bargaining
problems are generally more complicated. When it is infeasible or too costly for all players to
negotiate at the same time and the same place, the bilateral bargaining framework provides
a simple and attractive alternative.
Here we analyze a multi-agent bilateral bargaining model where players negotiate via a
sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. In each bilateral bargaining session, two players
negotiate via Rubinstein's (1982) bilateral bargaining framework. After a partial agreement,
one player e®ectively leaves the game and the other player moves to the following bilateral
bargaining sessions. The proposing player may either make an o®er to his opponent to leave
or demand to leave the bargaining himself. The bargaining protocol is hence determined
endogenously by the proposing player's choice of the type of proposals.
Consider asituationwhere, forsimplicity, threeplayersnegotiatetosharea pieofsizeone,
and every player has a simple linear utility function and a common discount factor ± 2 (0;1).
The negotiation is conducted by two separate bilateral bargaining sessions. Without loss of
generality, assume that players 1 and 2 bargain during the ¯rst session. Who bargains with
player 3 in the second session is crucial in ¯nding equilibrium outcomes. If player 2 always
bargains with player 3 in the second session, by backward induction, it is not hard to see











Suppose the negotiation is conducted by the \demand protocol" where during the ¯rst
session between players 1 and 2, the proposing player always demands a certain amount of
the pie to leave the bargaining, which leaves the other player to bargain with player 3 in
2the second session. Now which player, either player 1 or 2, will bargain with player 3 in the
second bargaining session depends on who is the proposing player when a partial agreement
is reached between players 1 and 2. It is involved but nevertheless straightforward to show
that such a protocol leads to a unique equilibrium outcome where player 2 accepts player 1's
demand immediately, then agrees with player 3 to split the remainder of the pie according







1 +± + ±2
!
: (2)
Alternatively, we may consider the \o®er protocol" where the proposing player always
o®ers certain amount of the pie to his opponent to leave the bargaining in the ¯rst session.
Then the proposing player of a partial agreement between players 1 and 2 will bargain
with player 3 in the second session. This o®er protocol also predicts a unique and e±cient












It is straightforward to show that both (2) and (3) converge to the corresponding Nash
bargaining solution (1/3,1/3,1/3) as ± goes to one, but solution (1) does not.1
In this paper, we consider this kind of multi-agent bilateral bargaining model where
the bargaining protocol is determined endogenously by proposing strategies. Except in the
last bargaining session, the proposing player may choose between making an o®er to his
opponent to leave and demanding to leave the bargaining himself. Solutions (2) and (3)
suggest that a proposing player would prefer demanding to making an o®er. When the
proposing player may choose between an o®er and a demand, there is indeed an equilibrium
where the proposing player always demands to leave the bargaining in every period, with (2)
as the equilibrium outcome. When the discount factor is not too small, however, there are
other equilibria as well in games with more than two players. But the o®er protocol never
1Suh and Wen (2003) show that, in a general setup, the unique equilibrium outcome from either the
demand protocol or the o®er protocol converges to the Nash (1950) cooperative bargaining solution in the
corresponding bargaining problem.
3arises in equilibrium for any discounting factor. The issue of ine±cient equilibria appears
due to the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. As the number of players increases, both
the set of discount factors that supports multiple equilibrium outcomes, and the set of the
¯rst proposing player's equilibrium shares are enlarged. The maximum loss of e±ciency
hence increases with respect to the number of players and the discount factor. For example
in games with four players, as players become su±ciently patient, the ¯rst player's highest
equilibrium share could be su±ciently close to one and his lowest equilibrium share could
be su±ciently close to zero. The game with four players has multiple equilibrium outcomes
(including ine±cient ones) as long as the discount factor is not less than 0.544.
This paper follows the line of researchthat extends Rubinstein's (1982) bilateral model to
the multilateral case. Because of its simplicity and strong predictability, Rubinstein's model
has been widely adopted as a basic bargaining framework in the literature.2 Generalizing
Rubinstein's (1982) result to multilateral bargaining models has been less successful. For
example, bargaining models of Haller (1986), Herrero (1985), and Sutton (1986) predict that
any partition can be supported as an equilibrium outcome when discounting is not too high,
while all these models reduce to Rubinstein's (1982) model in the bilateral case. One key
factor for the existence of multiple equilibrium outcomes in these models is the unanimity of
agreement. Although our model also has multiple equilibrium outcomes, it is more closely
related to the multilateral bargaining models of Chae and Yang (1988, 1990, 1994), Huang
(2002), Jun (1987), Krishna and Serrano(1996), Suh andWen(2003), and Yang(1992) where
partial agreements are allowed. In these bargaining models, one player makes a proposal and
his opponents may either accept or reject, either sequentially or simultaneously. A player
e®ectively leaves the bargaining after accepting an o®er. The ability to accept an o®er and
leave is not a®ected by other players' rejections of the proposal. Consequently, these models
restore the uniqueness of equilibrium with outcome akin to either (2) or (3). Since there is
2For recent developments in the multilateral bargaining literature, refer to Asheim (1992), Baliga and
Serrano (1995), Cai (2003), Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000), Muthoo (1999), Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990), Serrano (1993), and Vanntelbosch (1999).
4always a unique equilibrium that is also e±cient, these results are not a®ected by when a
partial agreement is honored, either immediately or until a full agreement is reached. When
there are multiple and ine±cient outcomes, such as in the model studied in this paper, the
time to honor a partial agreement becomes important.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model where
the proposing player can choose between two types of proposals, demand and o®er. Section
3 is devoted to the analysis of the model with three players, in order to demonstrate some of
the key arguments. In Section 4, we investigate the general case and analyze its equilibrium
outcomes. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. The proofs of propositions are given
in the Appendix.
2 The Model
A¯nite number of players, 1;2;:::;n, negotiate how tosplit apie ofsize1. Thenegotiation is
conductedthrough (n¡1) bilateral bargaining sessions where players 1 and2 negotiate inthe
¯rst session. Ineachbilateral bargaining session, two players bargainfor a partial agreement.
A partial agreement speci¯es a share to the player who agrees to leave the negotiation. The
other player moves to the following bargaining sessions to split the remainder of the pie with
the rest of the players in a similar fashion. In the last session, the two players (one of them
must be player n) simply negotiate how to split the remainder of the pie between them.
Each bilateral bargaining session follows the bilateral bargainingframework of Rubinstein
(1982). Inany period, one player, calledtheproposingplayer, makesa proposal andtheother
player, called the responding player, may either accept or reject the standing proposal. If the
responding player rejects the proposal then the game proceeds to the next period where the
current responding player will be the proposing player, and so on. If the responding player
accepts the standing proposal then the current bargaining session ends and the accepted
proposal becomes a partial agreement. Which player moves to the following sessions depends
3Refer to Cai (2000) where the cause of the ine±ciency or delay is not from the existence of multiple
equilbria but from the advantage of holding up the bargaining process.
5on the nature of the partial agreement. The proposing player i can make two types of
proposals: either demandxi forhimselfto agree toleavethegameor o®eryi to the responding
player to agree to leave the game. Since the proposing player can always make one type of
proposal unacceptable, for example the proposing player could demand all the remainder
of the pie or o®er nothing to the responding player, it is equivalent whether the proposing
player is allowed to make both types of proposals or to make only one type proposal. If
proposing player i's demand xi is accepted then player i will receive xi and leave the game
and the responding player will negotiate with the rest of the players. If the responding
player accepts o®er yi then the responding player will receive yi and leave the game, and
player i will negotiate with the rest of the players. Assume that the player with a lower
index initiates a proposal in any bargaining session. Denote the bilateral bargaining session
between players i and j as BG(i;j), that has the following structure:


















































Figure 1. The Bilateral Session Between Players i and j.
By allowing the proposing player to choose between two types of proposals, the bargain-
ing protocol is determined endogenously in equilibrium by the proposing player's strategy
choices. Since this model has multiple equilibrium outcomes, including ine±cient ones, as-
sume that the player who accepts an o®er or whose demand is accepted will consume his
share immediately for simplicity. Otherwise, we would need to trace when the last session
ends.
A typical outcome is as follows. Players 1 and 2 negotiate during the ¯rst session. After
reaching a partial agreement, one of them (either player 1 or player 2, depending on the type
6of the proposal accepted) negotiates with player 3, and so on. All players have a common
discount factor ± 2 (0;1) per bargaining period. It is assumed that there is no discounting
between consecutive bargaining sessions. The existence of discounting between consecutive
sessions will not a®ect the qualitative aspect of our results. According to those speci¯cations,
player i's payo® is ±ti¢si where si 2 [0;1] is the share of the pie player i receives in period ti.
In the case where player i never reaches any partial agreement, his payo® is zero and ti is set
to be in¯nity. Accordingly, there are certain restrictions on the speci¯cation of outcomes.
For example, the feasibility implies that s1 + s2 + ¢¢¢ + sn = 1. If ti = 1 then tj = 1 for
all j > i, which means if player i does not have an agreement neither does any player after
player i. For any player i, ti is either the ¯rst or the second largest element of ft1;t2;¢¢¢ ;tig,
which means that there is at most one player before player i will have an agreement after
player i by the sequential nature of bilateral bargaining sessions.
The model has perfect information and so histories and strategies are de¯ned inthe usual
way. A history summarizes all the actions played in the past and a strategy pro¯le speci¯es
an appropriate action for the acting player after every history. Any strategy pro¯le induces a
unique (either ¯nite or in¯nite) outcome path and the players evaluate their strategies based
on their payo®s from the induced outcome path. In the rest of this paper, we will study
subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes.
3 The Three-Player Game
In this section, we consider the model with 3 players. Since the model has ¯nite bargaining
sessions, the model is analyzed by backward induction. Therefore, studying the model with
3 players is not only the starting point of our analysis, but also provides us with some basic
intuition and methodology used in the general analysis.
Note that there are only two bargaining sessions. Recall the last session is a standard
Rubinstein game. Even if the proposing player proposes either an o®er or a demand, such
a modi¯cation will not change players' equilibrium strategies in this last session. Therefore,
7there is a unique equilibrium that is also e±cient. The equilibrium outcome depends on the
partial agreement in the ¯rst session. In particular, if we denote the share to the player who
left the game after the ¯rst session as X then the equilibrium outcome in the second session









where (1¡ X)=(1+ ±) is the share to the player from the ¯rst session and (1 ¡X)±=(1+±)
is player 3's share. We now analyze the players' strategic interaction during the ¯rst session.
Because of the proposing player's option to choose between two types of proposals, the
analysis is made signi¯cantly di®erent by the new elements in the model. In what follows,
we will ¯rst establish the existence of a perfect equilibrium for any discount factor, and then
characterize all perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Comparing outcomes from (2) and (3), it is obvious that player 1 prefers outcome (2) to
outcome (3) for any ± 2 (0;1). This observation suggests that the proposing player prefers
making an acceptable demand rather than an acceptable o®er. Proposition 1 asserts that for
any discount factor, there is a perfect equilibrium where the proposing player always makes
an acceptable demand in any period, which leads to (2) as the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1 Forany ± 2 (0;1), the model has an e±cient equilibrium where the proposing
player always demands 1=(1+±+±2), and the responding player accepts any demand no more
than 1=(1 + ± + ±2) or any o®er no less than ±=(1 + ± + ±2) during the ¯rst session. The
equilibrium outcome is given by (2).
The equilibrium of Proposition 1 is stationary and symmetric between players 1 and 2.
It is the standard argument that the proposing player should not make any unacceptable
proposal. When comparing between an acceptable demand and an acceptable o®er, the
acceptable demand dominates the acceptable o®er given that the proposing player always
makes an acceptable demand in the future.
8On the other hand, it is not an equilibrium where both players always make acceptable
o®ers during the ¯rst session. Given players' proposing strategies, solution (3) suggests that
a responding player in the ¯rst period would accept any proposal that leads to ±=(1+ 2±)
and the proposing player would have 1=(1 + 2±) from making the acceptable o®er. If the







1+ ± ¡ ±2
1 +2±
;
which is higher than 1=(1+ 2±). Therefore, the proposing player would prefer to make the
acceptable demand (1 +± ¡ ±2)=(1+ 2±) rather than the acceptable o®er which leaves him
1=(1+ 2±).4
It is not always the case that the acceptable demand dominates the acceptable o®er,
however. The following Proposition 2 demonstrates that when the discount factor is not too
small, the model has a stationary but asymmetric perfect equilibrium where player 1 always
makes an acceptable demand but player 2 always makes an acceptable o®er during the ¯rst
session.





then there is a perfect equilibrium where, during the ¯rst session, player 1 always demands
1=(1 + ±) and accepts any proposal which gives him no less than ±=(1 + ±), and player 2
always o®ers ±=(1 + ±) and accepts any proposal which gives him no less than ±=(1 + ±)2.
The equilibrium outcome is given by (1).
Condition (5) requires that ± ¸ (
p
5 ¡ 1)=2 ' 0:618. Notice that player 1 always makes
an acceptable demand and player 2 always makes an acceptable o®er so that the equilibrium
strategies specify the bargaining protocol where players 1 and 2 bargain in the ¯rst session
4Outcome (3) can, nevertheless, be supported by a non-stationary perfect equilibrium when there are
multiple equilibrium outcomes. Refer to Proposition 5 below.
9and players 2 and 3 in the second session. Player 2's strategy of making an acceptable o®er
may seem counter-intuitive. Given the switching in proposing strategies, player 1 certainly
bene¯ts since player 1's payo® when proposing is 1=(1+±). Therefore, player 2's acceptable
demand cannot be too high given that player 1's ¯nal payo® from such a proposal has to be
at least ±=(1+ ±), which implies that player 2 cannot demand more than (1 ¡ ±). On the
other hand, player 2 can guarantee himself 1=(1+±)2 by o®ering ±=(1+±) to player 1, which






(1+ ±)2 ¸ 1 ¡ ±:
Analogic to Proposition 2, the model has another stationary but asymmetric equilibrium
where player 1 always makes an acceptable o®er and player 2 always makes an acceptable
demand. The proof of Proposition 3 is similar to that of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Under condition (5), there is a perfect equilibrium where during the ¯rst
session, player 1 always o®ers ±=(1 + ±) and accepts any proposal which gives him no less
than ±=(1+±)2, and player 2 always demands 1=(1+±) and accepts any proposal which gives











Propositions 2 and 3 indicate that the model has multiple perfect equilibrium outcomes
when ± is not too small. Indeed Propositions 1, 2 and 3 give all the extreme equilibrium
outcomes for di®erent values of ±. In what follows, we derive the supremum and in¯mum of
a player's equilibrium payo®s by adopting Shaked and Sutton's (1984) method.
By Proposition 1, we know that the set of equilibrium payo®s to any player is not empty.
Also by symmetry between player 1 and player 2 during the ¯rst session, the supremum
and in¯mum of player 1's equilibrium payo®s when player 1 proposes are the same as those
of player 2's when player 2 proposes. Denote the supremum and in¯mum of the proposing
player's equilibrium payo®s during the ¯rst session in the three-player model as M3 and m3,
respectively. Both M3 and m3 depend on the discount factor ±.
10Note that the proposing player will never make a proposal where the responding player's
payo® is more than ± ¢ M3. On the other hand, the responding player will never accept any
proposal where his payo® is less than ± ¢ m3. Denote the proposing player's demand by x
and o®er by y. The conditions for demand x and o®er y to be acceptable are, respectively,
± ¢ m3 ·
1¡ x
1+ ±
· ± ¢ M3; and ± ¢ m3 ·
y
1+ ±
· ± ¢ M3: (6)
Then m3 and M3 are the in¯mum and supremum of the maximum of x and y=(1 ¡ ±),
since the proposing player chooses between making a demand and an o®er, subject to the




x subject to (1 ¡ x)=(1 +±) ¸ ±M3








Notice that in (7), the responding player's continuation payo® after rejection is ±M3 which
is the best situation for the responding player. On the other hand, in the worst situation to
the responding player where his continuation payo® is ±m3, the proposing player will obtain
M3, so we have
M3 = max
(





Solving (7) and (8), we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Conditions (7) and (8) yield
m3 = M3 =
1













Proposition 4 asserts that the perfect equilibrium outcomes of Propositions 1|3 are
indeed extreme equilibrium outcomes. Even in the case of the three-player case where the
11secondsession has a unique equilibriumoutcome, allowing players tochoose proposing strate-
gies leads to multiple equilibrium outcomes. Figure 2 below illustrates player 1's equilibrium

















Figure 2. Player 1's equilibrium shares when n = 3.
In addition to those e±cient equilibrium outcomes, thereare other e±cient and ine±cient
equilibrium outcomes. Since either player 1 or player 2 bargains with player 3 in the second
session where there is a unique equilibrium outcome, the restriction on the outcome that
can be supported by equilibrium is that player 3's payo® has to be ± fraction of the payo®
to either player 1 or 2. Proposition 5 completely characterizes the equilibrium outcomes in
the three-player case.
Proposition 5 Under condition (5), vector (v1;v2;v3) can be supported by a subgame perfect
equilibrium if and only if 9 T ¸ 1 and x 2 (0;1) such that for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j
vi = ±





and players' payo®s satisfy
v1 ¸
1
(1+ ±)2; v2 ¸
±
(1 +±)2; v3 = ±vj: (12)
12Proposition5 provides not only e±cient equilibrium outcomes (T = 1) but also ine±cient
equilibrium outcomes (T > 1) as well. The set of e±cient equilibrium payo®s shapes like
an \X" on the unit simplex. Any ine±cient equilibrium payo® is a convex combination of
0 and a point in such an \X" where player 1's payo® is bounded below by 1=(1 + ±)2 and
player 2's payo® is bounded below by ±=(1+ ±)2. It is interesting to observe that player 3's













as ± ! 1:
The ine±ciency of equilibrium outcomes is \persistent" in the sense that the ine±ciency
does not disappear as ± goes to one. This can be seen from conditions (11) and (12) since
only ±T is restricted by these two conditions. We can use 1¡ ±T to measure the ine±ciency.
As ± approaches to one, T can be chosen to be su±ciently large as long as ±T satis¯es (11)
and (12).
From the case of three players, we learned that the set of equilibrium payo®s can be quite
irregular and multiple equilibrium outcomes emerge even the subgame after the ¯rst session
has a unique equilibrium outcome. In analyzing the general case, we will concentrate on
equilibrium shares to the proposing player in the ¯rst session.
4 The General Analysis
In this section, we consider the general case with n-players. From the last section, we know
the set of equilibrium outcomes could be very complicated. Therefore, we will concentrate
our analysis on the equilibrium shares to the proposing player in the ¯rst session. Note that
the continuation game after the ¯rst session is the game with (n ¡ 1) players. The general
case is analyzed by mathematical induction. First, we establish the existence of a perfect
equilibrium in the general n-player case.
Proposition 6 For any ± 2 (0;1), the model with n players has an e±cient perfect equilib-
rium where the proposing player always makes an acceptable demand in any period in any
13session. The equilibrium payo® vector is (®n;±®n;¢¢ ¢;±n¡1®n) where
®n =
1
1+ ± + ±2 + ¢¢¢ + ±n¡1:
Denote mn andMn to be the in¯mum andsupremum of equilibrium shares to the propos-
ing player in the ¯rst session. Proposition 6 implies that both mn and Mn are well de¯ned
and mn · ®n · Mn. Rubinstein (1982) implies that m2 = M2 = 1=(1 + ±), and our
Proposition 4 asserts that
(m3;M3) =
(
(®3;®3) if ± < ®2;
(®2
2;®2) if ± ¸ ®2:
Now we derive the dynamics that determine the values of mn and Mn. First consider
mn, the in¯mum of the proposing player's equilibrium payo®s during the ¯rst session in
the case of n players. Note that if the responding player rejects the standing proposal,
his highest possible payo® will be ±Mn, resulting from a one period delay and the best
possible payo® available in the following period. If the proposing player demands x such
that mn¡1(1 ¡ x) ¸ ±Mn then the responding player will certainly accept since his worst
possible payo® from accepting x is not less than his best possible payo® from rejecting x.
On the other hand, if the proposing player o®ers y ¸ ±Mn then the responding player will
also accept. Then the lowest possible payo® to the proposing player cannot be less than
mn¡1(1 ¡ y) from the remaining sessions. Therefore, mn cannot be less than the highest
possible payo® to the proposing player from either the highest acceptable o®er or the lowest
acceptable demand. That is,
mn = max
(
x subject to mn¡1(1 ¡x) ¸ ±Mn















mn; Mn¡1(1 ¡ ±mn)
)
(14)
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
14Proposition 7 For all n ¸ 3, mn and Mn satisfy conditions (13) and (14).
It is not di±cult to show that both mn and Mn determined by (13) and (14) can be
supported as equilibrium shares of the proposing player for the corresponding discount fac-
tor ±. A more interesting question is then what value of ± will actually support multiple
equilibrium outcomes, i.e., mn < Mn. The analysis of the case with three players suggests
that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes as long as ± is not too \small." In the following
proposition, we are able to establish this result formally in the general case.
Proposition 8 For n ¸ 3, the model has a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if ± <
®n¡1. The unique equilibrium is the e±cient equilibrium stated in Proposition 6.
Proposition 8 implies that as the number of players increases, the set of discount fac-
tors that supports multiple equilibrium outcomes, hence ine±cient outcomes, increases as
well. Generally speaking, as n increases, it is more likely that the model will have multiple
equilibrium outcomes. Our next proposition, which is even more striking and seems counter
intuitive, is that when the model has multiple equilibrium outcomes, the set of the proposing
player's equilibrium shares is widened as the number of players increases. In other words,
Proposition 9 For n ¸ 3 and ± 2 [®n;1), we have mn+1 < mn < Mn < Mn+1.
When there are multiple equilibrium outcomes, player 1's best equilibrium share increases
and his worst equilibrium share decreases with respect to the number of players. This
polarized e®ect is due to the fact that in player 1's best equilibrium, player 1 will obtain the
best equilibrium during or after the ¯rst session from either accepting an o®er or making
an acceptable demand, while player 2 will always obtain the worst equilibrium during or
after the ¯rst session from either making an acceptable o®er or accepting a demand. In
order to support Mn to be player 1's equilibrium share, player 1 should always make the
highest acceptable demand and player 2 should always make the highest acceptable o®er
during the ¯rst session, after which player 2 will receive the worst equilibrium outcome
15in the continuation game. If the model with (n ¡ 1) players continues to have multiple
equilibrium outcomes, then player 3 will always make the highest acceptable demand and
player 2 will continue to make the highest acceptable o®er in the second session, from which
player 3's payo® is ±Mn¡1(1¡Mn). Otherwise, players 2 and 3 will make acceptable demands
on the remainder of the pie, from which player 2's and 3's payo®s are ®n¡1(1 ¡ Mn) and
±®n¡1(1¡Mn), respectively. This means that when player 1 obtains the highest equilibrium
payo®, payo®s to all the other players are uniquely determined. For example, when ± < ®k,
Proposition 8 asserts that the model with no more than (k + 1) players will have a unique
equilibrium outcome. This means that when there are n players, each of the last k sessions
has a unique equilibrium outcome, and each of the ¯st (n ¡ k ¡ 1) sessions has multiple
equilibrium outcomes. When player 1 receives Mn, player 2 will have to make acceptable
o®ers in each of the ¯rst (n ¡k¡1) session and will make the acceptable demand in session
(n¡k), while the ¯rst other (n¡k¡2) players (except player 2) will always make the highest
acceptable demands inthe ¯rst (n¡k¡1) sessions. Likewise, inthe equilibrium where player
1 receives mn, player 1 will always make acceptable o®ers during the ¯rst (n¡k¡1) sessions
and will make the acceptable demand in session (n ¡ k), while the other players in the ¯rst
(n ¡ k ¡ 1) sessions will always make acceptable demands. Proposition 10 provides the
dynamics for Mn and mn when ± is not too small. Proposition 10 asserts that, for example,
in the equilibrium where player 1 receives the highest payo® Mn, player 1 should always
make the highest acceptable demand and player 2 should always make the lowest acceptable
o®er during the ¯rst session. The continuation equilibrium after the ¯rst session depends on
how the ¯rst session ends. After player 2 accepts player 1's demand, player 2 will receive the
highest share Mn¡1 on the remaining pie. After player 1 accepts player 2's o®er, however,
player 2 will receive the lowest share mn¡1 on the remaining pie.








16Propositions 8 and 9 characterize two key properties of the set of proposing player's
equilibrium shares. It is important to emphasize that as the number of players increases, not
only the set of discount factors that supports multiple equilibrium outcomes but also the set
of the proposing player's equilibrium shares will be widened when there are multiple perfect
equilibrium outcomes.
5 Concluding Remarks
We studied a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining model where the negotiation is con-
ducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. Bargaining protocol is determined by
the players' equilibrium strategies. In contrast to the model where the bargaining protocol
is exogenously given, the model studied here, in which the proposing player chooses between
making an o®er and a demand, has multiple equilibrium outcomes in general. The model
always has a perfect equilibrium where the proposing player always makes an acceptable
demand in every period. In the case in which the bargaining protocol is exogenous where
the proposing player always makes an acceptable demand, the corresponding equilibrium
outcome converges to the Nash (1950) bargaining solution as players become su±ciently
patient even under a more general setup. We have shown that as the number of players
increases, not only the set of discount factors that support multiple equilibrium outcomes,
but also the set of proposing player's equilibrium shares increases. The threshold of discount
factor that supports multiple equilibria is ®n¡1 where there are n players. When n > 3 and
the model has multiple equilibrium outcomes, the ¯rst proposing player's best equilibrium
share could be much higher than ®2 (the case when the other player always bargains with
the rest of the players), but his worst equilibrium share could be much lower then ®
n¡1
2 (the
case when the ¯rst proposing player always bargains with the rest of the players). In order
to demonstrate this result, consider the case of n = 4. Solving (13) and (14), the set of the
¯rst proposing player's equilibrium shares is
17½ 1
1 + ± +±2 +±3
¾









when ± 2 [®3;®2)
"
1 ¡±
(1 +±)(1+ ± ¡ ±2)
;
1
1 +± ¡ ±2
#
when ± 2 [®2;1)
When ± < ®3, the model has a unique perfect equilibrium where player 1's share is equal
to ®4. When ± ¸ ®3, the model has multiple perfect equilibrium outcomes. It is interesting
to observe that as ± goes to one, player 1's highest equilibrium share M4 converges to 1,
and player 1's lowest equilibrium share m4 converges to zero. These properties can be easily

















Figure 3. Player 1's equilibrium shares when n = 4.
Comparing Figures 2 and 3, in the region of discount factor where there are multiple equilib-
rium outcomes, the set of player 1's equilibrium shares becomes larger by adding one more
player in the bargaining. In the case of n = 4, ®3 = ± yields ± = 0:544.
Our studies suggest that the most robust perfect equilibrium in this type of multi-agent
bilateral bargaining model is the symmetric and stationary equilibrium where the proposing
players always make acceptable demands, not only to the discount factor, but also with
18respect to many other aspects of the model speci¯cations, such as players' utility functions,
disagreement payo®s and discount factors. Because of the possibility of delay in reaching an
agreement, the assumption that the player who e®ectively exits the bargaining will consume
the share immediately signi¯cantly simpli¯es the general analysis. Otherwise, one needs to
trace how the whole game concludes in order to determine the equilibrium conditions in the
early sessions. Nevertheless, the general characteristics of our prediction will not change and
delay will occur in the early bargaining sessions as long as the discount factor is not too low.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: As we argued, thecontinuationequilibriumin the second session is
uniquesowe will concentrate on the players' strategies during the¯rst session. By symmetry,
we will simply examine strategies of the proposing player and the responding player in every
period.
First consider the responding player's strategies. If the responding player rejects the
standing proposal (either an o®er or a demand), he will be the proposing player in the next
period with an acceptable demand of x = 1=(1+±+±2). Therefore, if the responding player
rejects the standing proposal, he can secure himself a payo® of ±x. This implies that the
responding player will not accept any proposal that gives himself less than ±x.
Given the responding player's strategies, the proposing player has three alternatives;
making an acceptable o®er ±x, making an acceptable demand, or making an unacceptable
demand or o®er. From the last alternative, the proposing player will receive a payo® of ±2x.







On the other hand, the proposing player will have a payo® x0 by making the acceptable
demand x0. The condition for demand x0 to be acceptable is that the responding player's
19payo® from accepting demand x0 is not less than ±x:
1 ¡ x0
1+ ±
¸ ±x ) x
0 · 1¡ (1 + ±)±x = x: (17)
(17) implies that x is the best acceptable demand for the proposing player. Comparing the
proposing player's payo®s from the three alternatives, x, (16) and ±2x, it is easy to conclude
that the proposing player will make the acceptable demand x during the ¯rst session, which
leaves 1 ¡ x for players 2 and 3. Then in the second session, players 2 and 3 split 1 ¡ x
according to Rubinstein's shares, which give ±x and ±2x. Note that the equilibrium outcome
is e±cient. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that player 1's payo® from rejecting any standing proposal
is ±=(1+±) and player 2's payo® from rejecting any standing proposal is ±=(1+±)2. Therefore
both players' responding strategies are subgame perfect.
Now consider player 1's proposing strategies in the ¯rst session. If player 1 does not make
any acceptable proposal, his payo® will be ±2=(1+±) since player 2 will o®er ±=(1+±) in the









which means that player 1's demand 1=(1 + ±) is acceptable, so making any unacceptable
proposal is dominated by demanding 1=(1 + ±). If player 1 makes an acceptable o®er y1 ¸














Therefore, for player 1 during the ¯rst session, making any acceptable o®er is strictly domi-
nated by making the acceptable demand 1=(1+ ±).
Next we examine player 2's proposing strategies during the ¯rst session. If player 2
does not make any acceptable proposal, his payo® will be ±2=(1+ ±)2. If player 2 makes an






20whichimplies that making any unacceptable proposal is dominatedby makingthe acceptable






) x2 · 1¡ ±; (19)
then player 2 could not demand more than 1¡ ±. Under condition (5), we have that (19) is
no more than (18) since
(1¡ ±) ·
1
(1+ ±)2 , 1+ ± ¡ ±2 ¡ ±3 · 1 , (5):
Therefore, during the ¯rst session, player 2 should always make the acceptable o®er rather
than making any acceptable demand.
In this equilibrium, player 1demands 1=(1+±)andplayer2 accepts, whichleaves ±=(1+±)
to players 2 and 3 to share according to Rubinstein's solution. Soplayer 2's shareis ±=(1+±)2
and player 3's share is ±2=(1 + ±)2. This equilibrium outcome is e±cient since there is no
delay involved. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Recall (7) and (8), there are four cases to consider. Since two of
the four cases are symmetric, we only have to deal with three cases.
Case 1: Assumethat1¡±(1+±)M3 · (1¡±M3)=(1+±)and1¡±(1+±)m3 · (1¡±m3)=(1+±).












However, for m3 = M3 = 1=(1+ 2±) and for all ± 2 (0;1), we have
1¡ ±(1+ ±)M3 =









which contradicts the inequalities that de¯ne Case 1. Therefore, Case 1 is impossible.
Case 2: Assumethat1¡±(1+±)M3 ¸ (1¡±M3)=(1+±)and1¡±(1+±)m3 ¸ (1¡±m3)=(1+±).
This is the situation where both players prefer to make acceptable demands. Then (7) and
21(8) become
m3 = 1 ¡±(1+ ±)M3; M3 = 1¡ ±(1+ ±)m3 ) m3 = M3 =
1
1 +± + ±2:
It is straightforward to verify that the two inequality conditions hold for m3 = M3 =
1=(1+ ± +±2) and for all ± 2 (0;1). This means Case 2 is possible.
Case 3: Assumethat1¡±(1+±)M3 · (1¡±M3)=(1+±)and1¡±(1+±)m3 ¸ (1¡±m3)=(1+±).
This is the situation where the player who receives M3 prefers to make acceptable demands




; M3 = 1 ¡ ±(1+ ±)m3 ) m3 =
1




With these values of m3 and M3, the second inequality in Case 3 holds for all ± 2 (0;1) as









The ¯rst inequality in Case 3 holds if and only if (5) holds,









Case 4: Assumethat1¡±(1+±)M3 ¸ (1¡±M3)=(1+±)and1¡±(1+±)m3 · (1¡±m3)=(1+±).
As in Case 3, one would ¯nd that m3 = 1=(1+ ±) and M3 = 1=(1+±)2 when ± ¸ 1=(1 +±).
However, M3 < m3 is contradictory. Therefore, Case 4 is also impossible.
Summarizing Cases 2 and 3, m3 and M3 are given by (9) and (10). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Under (5), Propositions 2 and 3 hold. Consider the following
strategy pro¯le where players 1 and 2 disagree in the ¯rst (T ¡ 1) periods of the ¯rst
session and, depending which player proposes in period T, either player j agrees to player i's
demand x or player i agrees to player j's o®er x. Note that if T = 1 then i = 1 and j = 2 by
construction. Duringthe ¯rst (T¡1) periods, the proposingplayer either o®ers 0or demands
1, and the responding player will reject. If player 1 ever deviates from the outcome described
above, the continuation equilibrium will be the equilibrium from Proposition 3, and if player
2 deviates then the continuation equilibrium will be the equilibrium from Proposition 2.
22It is obvious that player i's payo® is vi and player j's payo® is vj in the strategy pro¯le
described above. The strategies after any deviation of either player 1 or 2 are subgame
perfect due to either Proposition 2 or 3. It remains to be shown that neither player 1 nor
player 2 has any incentive to deviate during the ¯rst (T ¡1) periods of disagreement. Based
on the strategy pro¯le, the proposing player will have at least 1=(1+±)2 and the responding
player will have at least ±=(1 + ±)2 due to (11) and (12)during the ¯rst (T ¡ 1) periods of
disagreement. On the other hand, the proposing player will obtain at most 1=(1+±)2 andthe
responding player will obtain at most ±=(1 + ±)2 from deviation. Therefore, neither player
1 nor 2 has any incentive to deviate in the ¯rst session with T periods, which concludes the
proof of Proposition 5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof is inductive. Proposition 1 is the special case of n = 3.
Suppose that Proposition 6 holds with n players. Now we prove Proposition 6 for (n + 1).
During the ¯rst sessionof bargainingbetweenplayers 1and2, assume that the player who
bargains with the remaining (n ¡1) players will receive ®n of the remaining share after the
¯rst session. Consider a symmetric and stationary strategy pro¯le between players 1 and 2
where the proposing player always makes the highest acceptable demand x. The responding
player's payo® from accepting x should not less be than ± ¢ x. That is,




If the proposing player decides to make the lowest acceptable o®er y, then y = ±x = ±®n+1,
which leaves the proposing player a payo® of
®n(1 ¡ ±®n+1) = ®n+1 ¢
1 +±2 +±3 +¢¢¢ + ±n
1+ ± + ±2 + ¢¢¢ + ±n¡1;
which is less than the acceptable demand ®n+1. Therefore, the proposing player will always
make the acceptable demand ®n+1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof is inductive. Proposition 8 reduces to Proposition
2 when n = 3. Suppose that Proposition 8 holds for n. In what follows, we establish
Proposition 8 for (n +1).
23When ± < ®n¡1 < ®n¡2, the supposition implies that the model with (n¡ 1) players has
a unique equilibrium outcome and mn¡1 = Mn¡1 = ®n¡1 by Proposition 6. From conditions





Mn · ®n¡1(1¡ ±Mn); and 1¡
±
®n¡1
mn ¸ ®n¡1(1¡ ±mn) (20)
Then conditions (13) and (14) become





















, (1¡ ®n¡1)(± ¡ ®n¡1) ¸ 0;
whichis false as when ± 2 (0;®n¡1). Therefore, Proposition6 predicts the uniqueequilibrium
outcome in the case of n players when ± < ®n¡1. By induction, the ¯rst part of Proposition
8 holds for all ¯nite n ¸ 3.
The second part of Proposition 8 asserts multiple equilibrium outcomes when ± ¸ ®n¡1.
Note that Proposition 6 implies that ®n¡1 can always be supported as the ¯rst player's
equilibrium share in the model with (n ¡ 1) players. In the ¯rst part of this proof, we
derived (21) and showed that the ¯rst inequality of (20) holds when ± ¸ ®n¡1. It remains
to be shown that the second inequality of (20) holds when ± ¸ ®n¡1. With (21), the second









, ®n¡1(1+ ± ¡ ±®n¡1) · 1;
which is trivial. Therefore, there are multiple equilibrium outcomes when± ¸ ®n¡1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9: For ± 2 [®n;®n¡1), Proposition 8 and (21) assert that
Mn+1 = ®2 > ®n = Mn; and mn+1 =
®n
1+ ±
< ®n = mn;
24which establishes Proposition 9 for ± 2 [®n;®n¡1).
For ± 2 [®n¡1;1), we will prove the proposition by induction. From Proposition 4, we
have the following inequalities:
m3 = ®
2
2 < m2 = ®2 = M2 = M3: (22)
Now suppose we have the following inequalities:
mn < mn¡1 · Mn¡1 · Mn: (23)
Note that the two weak inequalities in (23) are needed to accommodate (22) for the case of
n = 3. Also mn < Mn so the model with n players has multiple equilibrium outcomes. In the
remainder of this proof, we will prove (23) for (n+1) where the last inequality holds strictly
as stated in Proposition 9. By (23), we can support both Mn and mn as the proposing
player's equilibrium shares in the case of n players in the same way as in the case of (n ¡1)
players since both mn¡1 and Mn¡1 can be supported as the proposing player's equilibrium
shares in the model with n players. This implies that mn+1 · mn < Mn · Mn+1. Since




¢ Mn+1 < 1¡
±
mn¡1
¢ Mn; mn(1¡ ±Mn+1) < mn¡1(1 ¡ ±Mn):




¢ mn < 1¡
±
Mn
¢ mn+1; Mn¡1(1¡ ±mn) < Mn(1 ¡ ±mn+1):
Hence (14) implies that Mn < Mn+1. Therefore (23) holds for (n+1) with all strict inequal-
ities. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: Proposition 6 implies that mn · ®n for all n ¸ 2 and ± 2 (0;1).









25which is trivial under Mn ¸ ®2 and ± ¸ ®2 ¸ ®n¡1 ¸ mn¡1 due to the fact that















which is also trivial under Mn ¸ ®2 and mn · ®n · ®3 due to the fact that
±mn · ±®3 =
±







With (24) and (25), conditions (13) and (14) can be simpli¯ed as




which yield the dynamics of mn and Mn by (15) in the proposition. Q.E.D.
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